Thirty years ago, Rwanda experienced the 100-day-long genocide which resulted in several hundreds of thousands of deaths and destruction of the country. Since then, Rwanda has become one of the most developed states in Africa and has often been praised for its successful reconciliation process. However, all of this was done under the dominance of one single man, Paul Kagame, and has been done with increasing repression of any opposition to the regime run by the Rwandan Patriotic Front, which he leads. What does their landslide victory in the latest presidential and parliamentary elections foreshadow for the future of Rwanda?
Elections Without Competition
On 15th July 2024, Rwandans went to the polls in an astounding participation rate of 99.86%. Although voting is not officially obligatory, authorities ensure that everyone understands that abstention is not really an option in Rwandan elections, even if the result is well-known in advance, as it was the case this time again.
The expected fourth victory of the incumbent president, Paul Kagame, became a reality when he received 99.18% of the expressed votes. A result that in the words of some commentators “would embarrass other dictators”. His opponents, Frank Habineza from the Democratic Green Party of Rwanda, and independent candidate, Philippe Mpayimana, received respectively 0.5% and 0.32% of votes.
Although the popular support for Kagame is incontestable, this landslide victory is caused mainly by the fact that six of eight of his adversaries were barred from standing for the presidency, including the main figures of the opposition, Diane Rwigara and Victoire Ingabire. According to the National Electoral Commission responsible for the ballot, the excluded candidates did not meet the formal requirements, such as submitting all required documents. Nevertheless, numerous evidence of systematic repression of the opposition to Kagame’s rule that prevents political pluralism exists. For example, some opposition candidates to the presidency were previously convicted on politically motivated charges, and several members of the opposition parties have been found dead or have disappeared.
Similarly, the concurrent parliamentary elections to the Chamber of Deputies did not bring a surprise. The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), the dominant party in the state since 1994 led by Kagame, gained 69.8% of votes, and thus secured 37 out of the 53 elected seats. The Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party, which historically support the RPF, both obtained five seats. Interestingly, three small parties which received less than the 5% required to enter the parliament were given two seats each. However, according to the partial results before the intervention of the National Electoral Commission, these parties should have exceeded the 5% limit, so the final announced percentage of votes might suggest manipulation of the results, according to some experts.
Additionally, no independent international observers were allowed to monitor the elections this time, and the Rwandan National Commission for Human Rights only stated that “rights of voters, candidates, media, and poll observers, among others, were generally respected”, and commended the efforts made to include voters with disabilities, as well as the peaceful and secure atmosphere at the voting sites.
Rwanda on an Authoritarian Drift Since the Genocide
Contrary to the last statement, the repression of opposition in Rwanda is widespread. International humanitarian organisations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have repeatedly raised the issues of intimidation of opposition, killings and enforced disappearances, restrictions to the freedom of speech and of the media, among others. Not only political opponents of the RPF, but also journalists, representatives of international organisations, and civil society, face severe oppression in Rwanda.
All of these practices have occurred in Rwanda since the end of the genocide in July 1994 when the RPF seized control of the country by military force and formed a new government. The proclaimed efforts of transition and democratisation progressively resulted in consolidation of the one-party system. Anyone who is critical to the RPF risks being accused of genocide denial and ‘divisionism’. The RPF has fully used to its advantage the haunting memory of the genocide and the fact that they were those who had ended it and who had won the civil war, as well as international indulgence produced by the fear of the possible international co-responsibility for the genocide, and the belief in the transition paradigm.
Nevertheless, the deficiencies to the proclaimed democratic regime soon became evident. The organisation of elections as a demonstration of power rather than a free competition has been clear since the local elections in 2001, which were the first ones following Kagame’s ascent to the presidency. These elections were the first ones to bar the opposition candidates from campaigning. Furthermore, since that time, Rwandans vote by putting thumbprints next to the chosen candidates, which could be seen as signing the ballot paper, which means that the ballot is not secret.
The RPF regime was further strengthened in 2003 when the government banned the strongest opposition party at that time, the Hutu party Republican Democratic Movement, in spite of the accords [1] agreed on after the civil war. The efforts to establish a new opposition were thwarted. For instance, former President Pasteur Bizimungu was arrested and sentenced after his attempt to found a new political party.
Further obstruction to democracy occurred in 2015 when the parliament unanimously approved significant changes to the constitution. The revision of Article 101 shortened the length of the two allowed presidential mandates from seven to five years. More importantly, Article 172 stated that the incumbent president could run for a third seven-year-long mandate, as well as two other five-year-long mandates in 2024 and 2029. The article was tailor-made for one only person – Paul Kagame.
Paul Kagame, the Most Popular Autocrat in the World
The 2024 ballot represented the fourth electoral victory for Paul Kagame, after similarly high results of 95.05% in 2003, 93.07% in 2010, and 98.79% in 2017. However, he is considered to be the de facto leader of Rwanda since 1994, and he took over the presidency in 2000 after the demission of the first post-genocide president, Pasteur Bizimungu.
Kagame grew up as a child of Tutsi refugees in Uganda, where he also achieved his first military experience in the Ugandan civil wars before participating in the Rwandan civil war from 1990 to 1994 as the leader of the RPF. Being in this position, he might have been involved in the assassination of the previous Hutu president Habyarimana, which was one of the main triggers for the genocide. However, he is remembered mostly as the ‘hero’ who ended the genocide, which has made his path to authoritarian rule much easier.
Harsh Repression that Crosses the Borders
Moreover, the oppression of the RPF regime does not stop at the Rwandan borders. In 1996 and 1998, Rwanda invaded the Democratic Republic of Congo, where it participated in massive human rights violations alongside the rebel groups in the civil war. Nowadays, the influence of Rwanda in its western neighbour continues in the form of the support of the M23 rebel group [2], which has been accused of war crimes and human rights abuses, as well as the smuggling of strategic minerals from Congo.
The oppressive regime of Kagame has not only forced a lot of its critics, but also Rwandan citizens and Tutsi genocide survivors, into exile. However, residence in a foreign country does not protect Rwandans from Kagame’s reach. A recent project by Freedom House on transnational repression ranked Rwanda among states with the most aggressive campaigns to silence the dissenting voices of their citizens beyond their territory, alongside states such as Russia, China, and Iran. The organisation uncovered information about physical assaults and intimidation targeting high-profile Rwandans in exile, for instance Paul Rusesabagina [3], as well as widespread online surveillance of the whole diasporas, for example through the spyware Pegasus.
A few months before the election, a number of recent cases of Rwandan repression were exposed . They were exposed by an international group of journalists after the death of Rwandan investigative journalist, John Williams Ntwali, in January 2023, which occurred under suspicious circumstances.
What Outcome for Rwanda Three Decades After the Genocide?
The current situation of Rwanda does not depreciate the remarkable recovery and progress it has made since the genocide in 1994. However, even the multi-level justice and reconciliation process, often praised by the international community, has not satisfied everyone. One of the reasons for this is that no war crimes or crimes against humanity perpetrated by the RPF in 1994 were prosecuted,[4], mainly due to the insistence of the new regime.
Paul Kagame still profits from the memory of the genocide and enjoys broad support from the population. Nevertheless, those who wish for true political freedom and civil rights in Rwanda live in constant fear of the RPF regime, and will continue to do so for at least another five years.
Notes
[1] The Arusha Accords were signed in August 2003 by the representatives of the two sides in the Rwandan civil war, the Rwandan Patriotic Front and the Rwandan government in place. The RPF reaffirmed its commitment to the Accords in July 1994 when it was forming a new government, and initially implemented the logic of power-sharing between Hutus and Tutsis contained in them.
[2] Rwanda reportedly continues its military support of the M23 rebel group, also known as the March 23 Movement, which is one of the rebel groups opposing the Congolese army in the context of the prolonged unrest in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
[3] Paul Rusesabagina became known as a hotel manager who sheltered and saved hundreds of people during the 1994 genocide. Subsequently, he became a critic of Paul Kagame and moved to Belgium and later to the US. After receiving death threats in exile, he was forcibly taken in 2020 to Rwanda during an international flight, and sentenced to 25 years in prison on terrorism-related charges. He was eventually released in 2023 after a presidential pardon following international pressure on Rwanda.
[4] One strategy of the reconciliation process is the prohibition of ethnic identification in contemporary Rwanda. While this policy, codified in the constitution, might have supported the reconciliation between Tutsis and Hutus, it is possible that it helped cover the disproportionate participation of Tutsis in the new administration, in relation to the population which is mostly Hutu. Furthermore, it deprives members of the Twa community of almost any rights and protection as an indigenous minority in Rwanda, including the right to self-determination.
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Photograph
Paul Kagame is known as a president with authoritarian tendencies. His Excellency President Paul Kagame of Rwanda, speaking at the UK-Africa Investment Summit in London, 20 January 2020 20200120120038ZJW 4271 (49418924921), author: DFID - UK Department for International Development, 20 January 2020, source: Wikimedia Commons, CC BY 2.0 DEED.
